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With an increase in the spread and impact of independent regulatory agencies,
Africa now has a nascent but significant network of competition authorities and
other economic regulators.  This growth in African regulatory practice and influence
contributes to the value of adding the factor of competitiveness to the theory and
practice of African regional integration.  To add competitiveness may well increase
the total benefits and speed of these developments of multinational agreements and
regional integration.  A competition policy for Africa consistent with developmental
integration should attend to enforcement institutions (courts and authorities) and be
flexible regarding its national/supranational balance.
The Spread of Competition Authorities and Africa as a Regulatory Space
It is now easily arguable that we should regard Africa as a regulatory space.  The
mode and style in which public and private authorities engage capitalist firms on the
African continent is increasingly that of regulation.  Africa-wide, there is a recognition
of the role that the private sector may play in economic development.  The growth
of independent regulatory agencies (particularly competition authorities) as well as
the developing significance of regional economic communities shows the increasing
significance of regulatory governance in Africa.
In particular, competition regimes within Africa have rapidly spread over the past
two decades and continue to do so to this day.  By 2016, the World Bank reported
that “competition laws have been enacted in 27 African countries and five regional
communities.”  15 years earlier, there were only 13 jurisdictions with competition law
regimes.  The majority of these 32 regimes have enforcement agencies that describe
themselves as independent.  In July 2019, latest in the series of publications,
Advancing Regional Integration in Africa, ARIA IX notes 23 countries with both laws
and authorities.  In addition, these authorities are coordinating at the African level,
having set up an African Competition Network.  Building on work begun in 2010, the
network launched in Nairobi, Kenya in 2011, with 19 jurisdictions participating and
the UK and Canada providing funding.  This spread and the deepening influence of
competition authorities is perhaps an example of the influence and impact that soft
law can have:  law-like influence across borders beyond treaties and agreements.
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Much of this comes from the growth of enforcement capacity.  In work focusing
on the Southern African region, Burke and others have described the growth of
enforcement capacity for the competition law regime in nine African countriesBurke
et al., “Conclusion,” in Klaaren et al. (eds.), Competition and Regulation for Inclusive
Growth in Southern Africa, 2019). In the past 20 years, competition authorities have
been established in Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe.  Burke et al. note that in 2016, the nine competition
authorities had a total staff complement of 472 staff members and a combined
budget of US$ 38,1 million.
Burke et al. find a significant level of enforcement, with nearly 300 cases filed during
the period 2014-2016 concerning restrictive business practices.  South Africa has
just over half of these cases, but there is significant competition enforcement activity
in the rest of SADC.   Likewise, there is a large and growing caseload of merger
notifications and approval.  During this three year period, a total of 1595 merger
cases were identified across 8 jurisdictions in southern Africa (two-thirds from South
Africa).  While considerable variation and gaps remain, there is little doubt that
competition regulation has become a discernible force in African markets, a premise
upon which the recent study by Fox & Bakhoum is based.
Adding Competitiveness to the Theory and Practice of Free Trade Agreements
and Regional Integration in Africa
Competition policy may be roughly defined as government measures aimed at
influencing behaviour of firms and market structures.  The purpose of competition
policy is to promote, preserve and protect the competitive process and competition;
not protect competitors.  Further, it aims to promote economic efficiency, inclusive
of consumer welfare and other objectives.  Competition policy should complement
other policies including trade policy and industrial policy.  Competition law usually
prevents anticompetitive agreements, prevents abuse of dominance, and prohibits
anti-competitive mergers.  It is well-recognized that competition law and enforcement
needs competition policy and compliance to have impact at scale.
Free trade agreements in Africa are closely linked with the various regional
economic communities and the drive towards common markets and even, with the
African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), an African common market. 
There are varying perspectives on regional integration.  One view sees it primarily as
a form of liberalization (removing tariffs and non-tariff barriers).  Another view sees
deeper strategy of regional integration with attention to infrastructure development
(and other elements of industrial policy), with attention to institutional arrangements,
and with regard to collaboration to build regional value chains.
Building from this second view, we should ask the question:  “To what extent are
markets, firm behaviour and market power regional?”  In answering, we can see the
relationship between developmental regional integration and competition policy. 
This is because the nature of competitive rivalry and the power and interests of large
firms and their owners is at the heart of how countries develop.  Anticompetitive
arrangements can have a regional and international scope.  Thus, the gains from
regional integration are greater when imperfect competition is taken into account.
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  Indeed, gains can be had even from integration of similar economies.  Inclusive
growth has a competition dimension and for this to be properly understood it needs
to be seen from a regional perspective – as Roberts, Vilazaki, and Simbanegavi
have argued.
Beyond supporting inclusive growth through regional integration by attending to
competition regulation, there are other benefits of such attention.  These include the
exercise of regional cartel busting.  For instance, at least seven of the cartels busted
in South Africa had cross-border effects (see the chapter by Klaaren & Sibanda in
Klaaren et al., op cit.).
It is a larger topic than can be examined fully here, but what should be some of the
AfCFTA competition policy starting points?  Arguably, the existence and capacity of
implementing institutions and regional courts (and/or national courts with regional
jurisdiction) is a more significant factor than the binding nature of the supranational
law in this policy area.  Here, it is important to recognize that the SADC and the
EAC regimes are ‘flexible’ rather than legalised in terms of the influential description
of the African trade regimes by James Gathii (2011).  Further, with respect to the
overlap of national and supranational laws, it is important to:  recognise and accept
the degree of overlap between national and supranational regimes; recognise and
accept that supranational regimes have a useful role to play in two areas: (a) where
there are true gaps in national regulation (such as no national competition law and/or
no national competition authority) and (b) where it is appropriate to have a particular
substantive focus on regional competition law enforcement, such as cross-border
mergers; and have a coordination mechanism for areas of enforcement overlap,
including a mechanism to allocate matters to appropriate authorities.
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